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Abstract. According to an influential objection, which Martha Nussbaum has powerfully 
restated, expressing anger in democratic public discourse is counterproductive from the 
standpoint of justice. To resist this challenge, this paper articulates a crucial yet 
underappreciated sense in which angry discourse is epistemically productive. Drawing on 
recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, which emphasize the distinctive 
phenomenology of emotion, I argue that conveying anger to one’s listeners is epistemically 
valuable in two respects: first, it can direct listeners’ attention to elusive morally relevant 
features of the situation; second, it enables them to register injustices that their existing 
evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. Thus, when employed skillfully, angry 
speech promotes a greater understanding of existing injustices. This epistemic role is 
indispensable in highly divided societies, where the injustices endured by some groups are 
often invisible to, or misunderstood by, other groups. Finally, I defuse the most forceful 
objections to this defense—that anger is likely to be manipulated, that it is epistemically 
misleading, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic levels of trust—partly by showing 
that they overlook the systemic character of democratic discourse. 
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In the classic novel Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison (1952) depicts the perspective of an 
unnamed black American whose skin color renders him “invisible”: he is persistently 
ignored, misunderstood, or mistaken for another. In a final moment of introspection, the 





So why do I write, torturing myself to put it down? Because in spite of myself 
I’ve learned some things […] Why should I be the one to dream this nightmare? 
Why should I be dedicated and set aside—yes, if not to at least tell a few people 
about it? There seems to be no escape. Here I’ve set out to throw my anger in the 
world’s face […] ‘Ah,’ I can hear you say, ‘He only wanted us to listen to him 
rave!’ But only partially true: Being invisible and without substance, as it were, 
what else could I do? What else but try to tell you what was really happening 
when your eyes were looking through? And it is this which really frightens me: 
Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you? 
 
The passage is fascinating, not least for what it suggests about the communication of anger. 
First, the narrator emphasizes the importance of “throwing [his] anger” at his audience. 
Further, he seems to do so on epistemic grounds, to make visible what had previously been 
invisible, by foregrounding his nightmarish experiences. Relatedly, perhaps, he claims that in 
expressing his anger, he speaks for the audience.  
Interestingly, the invisible narrator is not alone in voicing such thoughts. His suggestions 
resonate strongly with the poet and activist Audre Lorde’s (1997: 278) assertion that “my 
anger and your attendant fears, perhaps, are spotlights that can be used for your growth, […] 
for corrective surgery”. Or consider, similarly, the novelist and civil rights advocate James 
Baldwin (1961: 205), who once declared that “to be a Negro in [America] and to be relatively 
conscious, is to be in a rage almost all of the time”, before recommending “control[ling] the 
rage so that it won’t destroy you”, turning it into a productive force. For him, as a novelist, 
doing so manifests itself in the process of “creat[ing] a person and mak[ing] other persons 




In this article, I examine the place of anger in democratic public discourse. In doing so, I 
will try to make sense of the recurrent themes above. How is publicly expressing anger 
“corrective surgery” for one’s audience? What is it capable of teaching, or making us feel? 
These themes, I will argue, point to important insights regarding anger’s function and place in 
democratic discourse—insights, moreover, which extant philosophical discussions of anger 
have sometimes hinted at, but never precisely captured. 
My focus will be on cases where the expressed anger is directed at significant injustices. 
Imagine, for example, an American civil rights activist in the 1960s, who publicly denounces 
the fact that blacks are unjustly treated as inferior. And suppose she expresses herself with 
deep anger. In this context, we can ask: is it morally appropriate that she publicly expresses 
this anger, when pursuing justice in conditions marked by deep ethical divides and pervasive 
injustices?  
Both historically and in contemporary debates, some philosophers—including, 
prominently, Martha Nussbaum—have answered this question negatively. Public expressions 
of anger, they suggest, are morally undesirable. Perhaps one of the most influential arguments 
for this view, an argument which is sometimes echoed in broader public discourse,2 asserts 
that expressing anger is counterproductive from the standpoint of justice: although it is an 
aversive reaction to injustice, it is likely to exacerbate existing injustices. Thus, justice would 
be better served, it is said, by forgiveness (McGary, 1989), love (Nussbaum, 2016), or even 
meekness (Pettigrove, 2012). 
While this argument is powerful, I will supply grounds for resisting it by articulating a 
key and underappreciated sense in which angry speech, when skillfully channeled, is 
epistemically productive. My argument proceeds as follows. After offering a working 
definition of ‘anger’ (Section 2), I provide an overview of the counterproductivity objection, 




consequentialist value of anger, we cannot circumvent the issue of whether anger is 
productive in terms of its consequences (Section 3). Accordingly, I then examine anger from 
a consequentialist perspective: drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, 
which emphasize the distinctive phenomenology of emotional experience, I develop an 
account of publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic productivity that is more precise and 
difficult to dismiss than traditional accounts have been. Communicating anger to one’s 
listeners can play an indispensable role in directing their attention to elusive morally-relevant 
features of the situation, and can help them register and understand injustices that their 
existing evaluative categories are not yet suited to capturing. This epistemic role is crucial in 
divided societies, where the injustices suffered by some groups are often invisible to, or 
misunderstood by, others (Section 4). In turn, I consider and defuse the most powerful 
objections to this defense—that angry speech is likely to be manipulated, that it is 
epistemically misleading or at least redundant, and that my defense presupposes unrealistic 
levels of trust—partly by showing that they overlook the systemic character of democratic 
public discourse (Section 5). I conclude by revisiting Ellison’s invisible narrator (Section 6). 
Before proceeding, two preliminary observations are in order. The first is about what I am 
not purporting to show. When exactly the positive consequences of anger are likely to 
outweigh its negative consequences is in part an empirical question, to be investigated by 
social scientists. My aim, therefore, is rather to identify and conceptualize a key epistemic 
benefit of angry speech, which falls out of a philosophical understanding of what anger is. 
Thus, while I cannot offer a knockout argument against the counterproductivity objection, I 
can and will develop conceptual resources in light of which we can better resist this 
objection.  
The second observation concerns the implications of my argument for broader debates 




decades—deliberative democracy—places processes of public deliberation at the center of 
the democratic ideal. While universal suffrage is essential to democratic decision-making, 
deliberative theories of democracy insist that exchanging reasons in public is of comparable 
importance.3  
However, classic formulations of the deliberative ideal have been criticized for putting 
forward an understanding of deliberation that is too restricted, thereby excluding many 
valuable kinds of contributions from democratic public discourse. Iris Marion Young (1996: 
122-125), for instance, famously observes that standard formulations of deliberative 
democracy require deliberators to engage in a dispassionate exchange of arguments. In doing 
so, she suggests, these theories overlook the importance of emotionally-charged and unruly 
forms of political discourse, such as personal narratives expressing anger or indignation.4   
My argument in the present article should reinforce this critique of exclusionary 
understandings of democratic public deliberation. While those who defend the place of 
emotions in public discourse often state or at least imply that this includes anger (e.g., Young 
1996: 124; Williams 2000: 146-152; Krause 2008: 119), they seldom focus their attention on 
anger. As a result, they have typically not tackled the counterproductivity objection head-on. 
This leaves them vulnerable to the response that although most emotions do have an 
important role to play in democratic public deliberation, anger does not. By theorizing the 
distinctive epistemic value of anger in political speech, my argument will help forestall this 
possible response. In this way, it will strengthen the case for adopting a more inclusive 
understanding of what constitutes appropriate democratic discourse.  
 





To define our focus more precisely, let us outline some key properties of the emotion I am 
calling ‘anger’. Like all emotions, and unlike moods, anger is an intentional attitude, in the 
philosophical sense of the term—an attitude that is directed at a particular object, its content.5 
Anger, put differently, is about something: A is angry that B betrayed him; C is angry that 
she was not promoted.  
Secondly, anger is a cognitive attitude: an important part of what anger does is aim 
accurately to represent certain features of the world. More specifically, as Zac Cogley has 
argued, anger presents the content it is directed at as involving a moral violation or injustice. 
“Being angry with someone”, Cogley suggests, “is (in part at least) to appraise her conduct as 
wrongful”. Because anger has this cognitive dimension, we can assess it as being more or less 
correctly directed, or fitting. That is, since anger presents its object as involving an injustice, 
objective standards of justice give us a benchmark against which we can evaluate whether 
particular instances of anger are fitting or unfitting.6  
In the first place, anger is fitting or correctly directed only if its content actually does 
involve an injustice or moral wrongdoing. If I am angry that you stole from me, but you did 
not steal from me, or stealing is not wrong, then my anger is unfitting. However, in his 
discussion of anger’s fittingness, Cogley rightly observes that this is not a sufficient condition 
for anger to be fitting.7 Anger comes in various degrees of intensity. So, a further condition 
for anger to be fitting is that its intensity be proportionate to the severity of the injustice it is 
purporting to represent. Rage is not a fitting response to a minor moral violation, such as your 
borrowing my favorite pen without permission.  
One upshot of this account is that anger’s fittingness, its cognitive accuracy, comes in 
degrees: anger can be more or less incorrect in presenting its content as involving an injustice 
or moral wrongdoing. A number of politically salient cases bring this out. At one end, a civil 




racial segregation really did exist and really was deeply unjust. At the other extreme, imagine 
a white supremacist who experiences rage towards a black family for moving to their 
neighborhood. Here, the anger seems wholly unfitting: there is intuitively no injustice, let 
alone a severe injustice, committed by the black family. An intermediate and more complex 
case might be that of an American automotive worker who is laid off. Let us assume that his 
employers dismissed him unfairly, and that their decision was unrelated to competition from 
migrant labor. Assume, furthermore, that the worker feels deep anger at having been fired, 
which (perhaps as a result of being misled by xenophobic demagogues regarding the cause of 
his joblessness) he directs at immigrants. The cognitive fittingness of his anger seems mixed: 
his anger correctly tracks that an injustice is involved in his joblessness. But it incorrectly 
represents immigrants as blameworthy for this injustice. 
The majority of this paper will focus on public expressions of anger that, like the first 
case, are fitting or correct. While expressions of anger whose fittingness is mixed (like the 
automotive worker case) also have some epistemic value, cases of fully fitting anger illustrate 
the epistemic function I will be theorizing more cleanly. Nevertheless, Section 5 will return to 
the challenges raised by expressions of unfitting or partly-fitting expressions of anger. Such 
instances of anger are widespread in non-ideal conditions. Importantly, moreover, in actual 
political contexts, it can be difficult to discern how fitting or unfitting a given expression of 
anger is. Indeed, correctly identifying which particular instances of anger are tracking a 
genuine injustice can require complex factual and moral judgments, which might be 
contested. So, even if I am correct in thinking that expressions of fitting anger have a 
distinctive and crucial epistemic role to play in public discourse, we will need to consider 
how the presence of unfitting anger in politics complicates my defense of publicly-expressed 




A third key feature of anger is that it is phenomenologically distinctive: there is a 
distinctive qualitative experience that is involved in being angry at something. This 
experience is partly characterized by certain bodily feelings, such as an increased heart rate, 
feeling hot, or trembling. However, and this will prove important, anger’s distinctive 
phenomenology also concerns the content it is directed at. A common observation amongst 
philosophers of emotion is that although emotions are directed at objects that are already 
given to us through perception, imagination, memory, or belief, emotions do not leave the 
representation of these objects unchanged. Instead, they are “distinctive ways of seeing a 
situation” (Jones, 1996: 11). In Section 4, I will expand on how anger characteristically 
affects the way we experience its content, and why this matters politically. 
Finally, besides having a cognitive dimension, anger has a conative aspect. Not only is 
anger an attitude which aims to represent something about the world, but it also disposes us 
to action. For example, A’s rage at the unfair treatment of blacks in the criminal justice 
system may motivate A to retaliate against law enforcement agencies, or to protest for their 
reform.  
With this picture of anger in mind,8  we can define this article’s focus more precisely. As 
we will see shortly, Martha Nussbaum (2015) has mounted an influential challenge to anger, 
which centers on its conative dimension: anger is problematic, she claims, because it often 
disposes us to retributive or vengeful actions, actions aimed at inflicting payback on the 
perpetrators of injustice.9 But even Nussbaum allows for some forms of anger, which she 
labels “transitional anger”, and of which Martin Luther King, Jr. is the paradigmatic 
illustration. 
While transitional anger’s most distinctive attribute is that it is not retributive (2015: 54), 
Nussbaum’s discussion of King makes it clear that it has further distinguishing properties. A 




morally deficient object, it swiftly transforms into a forward-looking attitude, which is 
oriented towards advancing justice. Thus, someone experiencing and expressing transitional 
anger does not dwell on past injustices (2015: 52-54). Thirdly, although transitional anger 
sometimes moves individuals to non-retributive violence (for instance, in self-defense), it 
habitually motivates non-violent actions (2015: 52-54; see also Nussbaum, 2016: 212, 221). 
Finally, transitional anger has a distinctive tone: its typical expression is not fiery or harsh, 
but calm and self-controlled (Nussbaum, 2016: 222, 228-230).  
In this light, to avoid arguing against a straw man when defending anger’s place in 
democratic discourse, I will only consider non-transitional forms of anger. To this end, this 
article focuses largely on the public speech of Frederick Douglass (1818-1895), an 
abolitionist leader who escaped from slavery, and Malcolm X (1925-1965), who famously 
militated against the oppression of black Americans. Both were heavily involved in the 
struggle for racial justice, and both were reputed for their intensely angry rhetoric.10  
Crucially, the anger they expressed was seldom transitional anger. First, its conative 
dimension, or aim, could be retributive. Douglass, for instance, once asserted that 
slaveholders “deserve to have [their throats] cut” (cited in Oakes, 2007: 100).  And even 
when its aim was not retributive, their anger nonetheless typically differed from transitional 
anger.  It was often agitated and harsh, sometimes shading into rage, it did not shy away from 
encouraging violence, and it often dwelled on past and current injustices. Consider, for 
example, Malcolm X’s insistent depictions of the “nightmare” constituted by black 
Americans’ daily lives—a rhetoric which contrasted so starkly with King’s own forward-
looking rhetoric of “dreams” that King repeatedly distanced himself from it.11 
Admittedly, focusing on the political speech of Douglass and Malcolm X does mean that 
my examples will be somewhat US-centric. This is by no means to suggest that the value of 




instance, Sonali Chakravarti (2014) has beautifully chronicled expressions of deep anger 
within the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Prima facie, the reasons I 
will introduce for thinking that publicly expressing non-transitional anger is epistemically 
valuable should also be applicable in non-US contexts such as this one. Here, however, I 
focus on Douglass and Malcolm X because they illustrate my theoretical argument 
particularly vividly, and because, given how embedded they are in the struggle for racial 
justice in the US, they constitute a natural counterpoint to Nussbaum’s own running example, 
Martin Luther King, Jr.  
In addition to these dialectical reasons, there are also political reasons for examining the 
value of such unsanitized anger. Douglass and Malcolm X are interesting orators on which to 
base a philosophical assessment of angry public discourse partly because they played 
prominent roles in their respective struggles. What is more, the intensity of their anger echoes 
that of the three figures we started with. Baldwin, in particular, makes it clear that it is rage 
he and other black Americans needs to control and channel. What this suggests is that 
experiencing non-transitional anger is common in non-ideal political contexts where 
injustices are widespread. And although expressions of more moderate or transitional anger 
may be more pervasive in the public sphere than expressions of non-transitional anger—at 
least in mainstream media outlets—the prominence of public speakers like Douglass or 
Malcolm X suggests that public expressions of non-transitional anger do nevertheless occupy 
a substantial place. So, the question of whether or not individuals should publicly express 
non-transitional anger is a politically salient one. As a result, while political philosophers 
have given due attention to the rhetoric of more moderate speakers, like Martin Luther King, 
Jr.,12 achieving a balanced normative assessment of democratic discourse in non-ideal 
conditions also requires paying close attention to the more controversial, but nonetheless 





3. The Counterproductivity Objection: An Overview 
3.1. The Counterproductivity Objection 
 
One of the most common charges against publicly expressing non-transitional anger is that 
doing so is often counterproductive: it is likely to amplify rather than alleviate existing 
injustices. This view has a distinguished philosophical history. Perhaps most famously, 
Seneca asserts that anger is radically at odds with humankind’s ethical ends: “mankind is 
born for mutual assistance; anger for mutual ruin” (I.5). Thus, “anger has nothing useful in 
itself” (I.9). The view that anger and its expression are counterproductive also has prominent 
contemporary advocates. Glen Pettigrove, for instance, notably suggests that because anger 
may interfere with interpersonal communication, blind angry individuals, and motivate 
oppressive actions, “the person who does not grow angry […] will be better positioned to 
focus on promoting common goods” (2012: 347, 369-370). In contemporary philosophy, 
however, the counterproductivity objection owes its most prominent restatement to Martha 
Nussbaum.13 
 Although Nussbaum is also concerned with anger’s intrinsic moral standing, she 
frequently deplores its bad consequences. Firstly, Nussbaum claims, anger tends to be an 
irrational waste of energy, which distracts from the pursuit of justice. This is because, for 
Nussbaum, anger typically motivates individuals to seek payback, even though seeking 
payback will rarely undo the wrong which prompted the anger. Hence, “if we ponder the 
futility of the payback wish […] we quickly discover that non-anger and a generous 
disposition are far more useful” (2016: 228). 
For similar reasons, Nussbaum continues, anger is likely to positively obstruct the pursuit 




targets, expressing anger undermines interpersonal cooperation. And promoting justice on a 
wide scale may well require interpersonal cooperation. In the worst cases, by inciting 
payback and eroding trust, anger risks triggering a “cycle of blood vengeance” (2016: 1, 230-
33). This is presumably what Martin Luther King feared when condemning Malcolm X’s 
violently angry rhetoric, which he claimed could “reap nothing but grief” (cited in Baldwin, 
1986: 403). Thus, expressing anger may seem misguided if we care about advancing justice: 
angry discourse seemingly hurts rather than helps the promotion of justice, and should 
therefore be condemned, just as King condemns Malcolm X’s fiery rhetoric. 
 
3.2. Consequentialist and Non-Consequentialist Strategies 
 
A direct strategy for responding to this objection consists in arguing that anger is often not 
counterproductive, as it has more good effects than bad effects. However, to sidestep the 
thorny issue of whether or not anger is counterproductive, which is intimately bound up with 
empirical questions, Amia Srinivasan suggests an alternative strategy. According to 
Srinivasan, the question of whether we should feel and express anger is not fully answered by 
an assessment of anger’s consequences. Even if we ascertain that overall, we have 
instrumental reasons not to get angry, there may still be intrinsic reasons to do so, reasons 
unrelated to its consequences. “For any instance of counterproductive anger we might still 
ask: […] Is the anger, however unproductive, nonetheless apt?”(Srinivasan, forthcoming: 4).  
What makes anger apt? Remember that anger has a cognitive dimension: it is directed at 
an object which it represents as involving a moral wrongdoing or injustice. Anger is 
cognitively fitting, recall, only if its object actually involves a moral violation or injustice and 
only if it is proportionate to that injustice. For Srinivasan, aptness is the intrinsic moral value 




suggestion is that, just as there is intrinsic aesthetic value in appreciating beauty or the 
sublime, so too there is intrinsic moral value in anger that correctly appreciates the injustice 
of a state of affairs (forthcoming: 5-10).  
Because anger is apt in virtue of fittingly or correctly registering its object’s moral 
properties, its aptness does not depend on producing good consequences. Thus, even if anger 
is instrumentally problematic, its intrinsic value suggests that we might yet be able to resist 
the conclusion that it is all-things-considered morally undesirable.    
One worry with this response is that, for Nussbaum (2015: 41-51), anger’s tendency to 
motivate retributive action also makes it morally questionable from a non-consequentialist 
perspective. On her view, either the desire for payback involves an immoral obsession with 
the relative status of others, or it displays an irrational disposition to produce futile suffering. 
Since both traits are vicious, the fact that anger’s conative dimension disposes us to 
retributive action shows it to be intrinsically immoral. 
In reply, Srinivasan denies that such a tight connection obtains between anger and 
retribution. “Anger without the desire for revenge is something many of us know well”. 
When a friend betrays me, Srinivasan suggests, it is perfectly conceivable that my ensuing 
anger may motivate me simply to seek his recognition that he has wronged me. And this 
desire for recognition, it seems, has no essential connection to the desire for revenge 
(forthcoming: 7-8). If this is right, the upshot is that anger is not inherently associated with 
revenge. Though anger may sometimes cause revenge, it is not itself essentially vindictive. 
So, even accepting for the sake of argument that retribution is inherently immoral, it would 
not follow that anger is intrinsically immoral. 
But even if Srinivasan is correct, this non-consequentialist strategy does not allow us to 
circumvent the counterproductivity objection altogether. It is implausible (and I take it 




expression of counterproductive anger has absolute force. In other words, the aptness of 
anger gives us a pro tanto moral reason in favour of publicly expressing apt anger, but this 
moral reason could in principle be overridden by countervailing moral reasons.  
The counterproductivity objection purports to give such countervailing moral reasons: if 
publicly expressing anger is indeed counterproductive, this gives us pro tanto moral reasons 
not to do so. And if expressing anger is highly counterproductive, it is possible that these 
consequentialist reasons against expressing anger outweigh the non-consequentialist reasons 
for expressing anger. To illustrate: if expressing rage really would have caused Abraham 
Lincoln to fail in his attempt to abolish slavery, and Martin Luther King, Jr. to fail in his 
leadership of the civil rights movement, then one might plausibly think that, overall, caring 
about justice required that they refrain from expressing anger. Correspondingly, if expressing 
anger really is extremely counterproductive, it might seem that enraged orators like Douglass 
and Malcolm X were overall wrong, from the perspective of justice, to express themselves as 
they did. 
To strengthen the case in favour of publicly expressing anger, then, we should not stop at 
the claim that anger has non-consequentialist value. We should also challenge the claim that 
anger is categorically bad from a consequentialist perspective. Hence, although I agree with 
Srinivasan that apt anger has intrinsic value, the rest of this article tackles the 
counterproductivity objection more directly, by putting forward an important way in which 
publicly expressing anger can be epistemically productive. In doing so my aim is not to 
establish that publicly expressing anger is never counterproductive, or that the all-things-
considered tally of moral reasons invariably supports publicly expressing anger. Rather, it is 
to add an important class of pro tanto moral reasons to the tally board, and thereby reinforce 




One might worry that directly challenging the counterproductivity objection’s 
consequentialist claim is essentially an empirical task, which should devolve to social 
scientists. However, philosophers can also play a significant part. When social scientists 
investigate the empirical consequences of public anger, they do not look randomly, but 
instead proceed with some theoretical hypotheses regarding what types of effects might be 
reliably related to anger. The task of developing such hypotheses is one that philosophers can 
fruitfully contribute to. By elucidating emotions’ phenomenology, intentionality, and relation 
to epistemic values, philosophical accounts of emotions help illuminate what kinds of 
consequences we can expect emotions to produce. Accordingly, in what follows, I oppose the 
counterproductivity objection by identifying and conceptualizing a crucial positive 
consequence of anger.  
 
4. The Epistemic Benefits of Publicly-Expressed Anger 
 
Opponents of the counterproductivity objection have enumerated various goods that anger 
can produce. Anger, it is said, motivates others to oppose injustice (Lorde,1997: 290), helps 
one retain one’s self-respect (Bell, 2009; Borgwald, 2012), and enhances one’s perceived 
competence and social status (Tiedens, 2001). Without rejecting these suggestions, I will 
specifically investigate the epistemic value of communicating one’s anger.  
The view that anger and its public expression are epistemically valuable is not 
uncommon. As observed in the introduction, it is popular amongst writers and activists. 
Recall, for example, the invisible narrator’s assertion that his anger aims to make visible what 
had been overlooked, and Lorde’s reference to her anger as a “spotlight”. Furthermore, this 
view has been taken up by philosophers, particularly feminist philosophers, as part of a 




Nevertheless, the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger has yet to be articulated 
adequately. In the first place, some philosophers who discuss anger’s epistemic worth are not 
primarily concerned with the value of publicly communicating anger (Jaggar, 1989; Bell, 
2009). And most of the defenses that are concerned with publicly communicating anger are 
largely programmatic, rather than precisely developed (Lorde, 1997; Frye, 1983). An 
exception here is Chakravarti, who has recently explored the value of anger in victim 
testimony. But Chakravarti (2014: 2) does not avail herself of recent developments in the 
philosophy of emotion, which—I will argue—are needed to appreciate what is distinctive 
about publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic contribution. These limitations have enabled 
critics of publicly-expressed anger to acknowledge that it has some epistemic value, while 
downplaying the relative importance of that value. To pre-empt such replies, I will explore 
the epistemic value of publicly-expressed anger in a way that makes it clearer why this 
epistemic role matters, and why it cannot easily be performed without anger. 
 
4.1.The Theoretical Case 
 
Some epistemic benefits of publicly expressing anger are relatively uncontroversial. When 
public speakers express their demands with sincere anger—either by displaying the 
conventional physiological and vocal signs of anger, or by explicitly affirming that they are 
angry—we learn that they and those they represent are angry. Given an understanding of 
what anger is, this is already learning a substantial amount about their psychology. We learn 
that they are experiencing certain bodily feelings, like tenseness, that they have the sense that 
something is seriously morally amiss in their situation, and that they might be driven to action 




Although providing this information is an important epistemic function, two worries 
arise. Firstly, one might think that these functions could largely be performed without 
expressing full-blown anger. Pettigrove (2012: 355), for instance, remarks that refraining 
from anger did not prevent Abraham Lincoln from expressing his moral opposition to 
slavery. In a letter to a political opponent, for example, Lincoln (1860: 152) declares: “You 
think slavery is right and ought to be extended; we think it is wrong and ought to be 
restricted. For this, neither has any just occasion to be angry with the other”. Similarly, 
Nussbaum (2016: 6) might again point to transitional anger. The entire cognitive content of 
transitional anger, she claims, is “How outrageous. Something should be done about that.” 
Thus, expressing transitional anger, as Martin Luther King, Jr. did, seemingly suffices to 
communicate the belief that a situation is unjust, and the disposition to act on this basis.  
Secondly, remember that we set out trying to illuminate the appealing observations 
Ellison’s invisible narrator made about anger, observations which Lorde and Baldwin echoed. 
But the above account of publicly-expressed anger’s epistemic value does not fully capture 
what they meant. The invisible narrator declares that his anger teaches us something about 
the world, shining a light on nightmarish features we had overlooked. So far, however, the 
epistemic function of anger is merely that it teaches us something about the speaker’s 
psychology, not about the world she is looking at. Nor, moreover, does the present account 
elucidate Baldwin’s suggestion that useful rage works by making listeners feel what the 
speaker feels. 
We need to isolate a distinctive epistemic function of angry speech, one that is capable of 
overcoming these concerns. To this purpose, I suggest that angry discourse is epistemically 
important not just because it tells the audience that the speaker is angry, but also because it 
can help them imaginatively experience what it is like to be in the speaker’s shoes, how the 




audience to empathize more fully with the speaker, where I am taking “empathy” to be 
synonymous with “imaginatively taking on the perspective of another to grasp how things 
appear or feel from there”.15  
How does this work? The first thing to notice is that publicly expressing anger can be a 
means of transmitting anger to one’s audience. Suppose speaker A is describing an unjust 
state of affairs—say, slavery—in order to denounce it. But instead of simply enumerating 
facts about slavery, A expresses his intense anger, with the aim of arousing similar emotions 
in the audience. In doing so, A is making use of the near-universal propensity for human 
beings to resonate with or “catch” the emotions of others. Hume (2009[1738]: 3.3.1.7) 
famously observes this general tendency: “as in strings equally wound up, the motion of one 
communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to the 
other”.  
This phenomenon is well documented in contemporary psychology, under the heading of 
“emotional contagion”. Human beings tend to mimic the expressions, vocalizations, postures, 
and movements of others, in a way that leads them to experience the emotions of others. This 
process is typically automatic, involuntary, and largely unconscious.16 Importantly, moreover, 
this effect also holds with anger, specifically. One study, for instance, finds that when 
speakers raise their voices and accelerate their speech, “this is likely to raise the listener’s 
blood pressure and feelings of anger” (Siegman et al, 1990: 641).17 In short—and here we 
have an echo of Baldwin’s thoughts about rage—given the tendency for emotional contagion, 
infusing one’s narrative with anger can cause one’s audience to feel that anger. 
To illustrate, consider Douglass’s indictment of slavery. Douglass, one historian records, 
was known for his fiery passion: “when he spoke, he roared, his booming baritone 
complemented by waving arms”. And the fire was infectious: Douglass deliberately used this 




listeners […] to furious outrage” (Oakes, 2007: 90-93). Nowhere was this effect so clearly 
reported as in William Lloyd Garrison’s account of Douglass’s first public speech: 
 
I shall never forget […] the extraordinary emotion it excited in my own mind—
the powerful impression it created upon a crowded auditory […] I think I never 
hated slavery so intensely as at that moment; certainly my perception of the 
enormous outrage which is inflicted by it […] was rendered far more clear than 
ever (1845: iv, emphases added). 
 
What the quote unambiguously shows is the contagious nature of Douglass’s anger, which 
spreads not just to Garrison, but to the audience generally. 
Publicly expressing anger about x, then, can help one’s audience experience anger about 
x. But why does it matter epistemically? As I noted earlier, philosophers of emotion 
commonly argue that emotional deliverances have a distinctive phenomenology, or felt 
experience. Put differently, they are distinctive ways of seeing the object that they are 
directed at.18 Hence, conveying one’s anger to one’s listeners helps them imaginatively 
undergo a distinctive qualitative experience. More specifically, the audience’s perspective-
taking or empathy is rendered more complete by emotional contagion. As the audience tries 
to adopt speaker A’s perspective, their imaginative reconstruction is altered by the anger they 
have infectiously gained from A. Not only is Douglass’s audience imagining the facts about 
slavery he is reporting, but the felt quality of their imaginings is colored by the anger he has 
transmitted to them. Thus, emotional contagion helps them more fully adopt Douglass’s 
angry perspective. 
For our purposes, the fact that the audience’s imaginative reconstruction of the speaker’s 




epistemically valuable—that is, only if it enriches our understanding of the anger’s object. So 
the question is: how does the phenomenology of anger yield a better understanding of the 
anger’s object? 
To appreciate how it does so, let us consider two aspects of what philosophers of emotion 
have argued characterizes the phenomenology of emotional representation. The first relevant 
feature is that emotions are sources of salience: they draw our attention to certain aspects of a 
situation, and thereby place some properties of that situation into the foreground.19 Thus, we 
have a way to understand Lorde’s reference to anger as a “spotlight”. Emotions help us 
navigate complex environments by selecting features of the environment and highlighting 
them. In doing so, they “rende[r] previously ignored features and previously unknown 
patterns salient” (Elgin, 2008: 45). 
Which features do emotions call our attention to? Recall that the fittingness of an emotion 
depends on whether its object involves certain evaluative properties: loss for grief, danger for 
fear, injustice for anger, and so on. Hence, one intuitive proposal is that a given emotion puts 
a spotlight on aspects of its object that are liable to ground those evaluative properties. Take 
the case of fear. If I am walking home at night and am afraid, my fear highlights features of 
the environment that may make it dangerous: the street’s emptiness, the absence of lighting, 
and the footsteps behind me (Elgin, 2008: 43-44). By analogy, we should expect anger to 
highlight patterns of behavior that are liable to ground injustices.  
Putting these observations together, we have a first sense in which anger’s 
phenomenology is epistemically valuable. Anger renders salient properties of our situation 
that are liable to ground injustices. Because the environments we navigate are extremely 
complex, we may otherwise have failed to notice these properties. Thus, perceiving a 
situation with anger can make us notice an injustice that we would otherwise have 




given injustice can help us see why something is unjust. Hence, the salience role of anger is 
epistemically valuable not only because it can yield knowledge that an injustice is taking 
place, but also because it facilitates a greater understanding of the nature of that injustice. 
A second characteristic of emotions’ phenomenology suggests that they are epistemically 
valuable: in virtue of having a quasi-perceptual felt quality, it is commonly argued, emotional 
representations of objects allow us to register evaluative properties in a way that can be more 
fine-grained than our evaluative concepts would allow. While this claim is especially at home 
amongst theories that explicitly identify emotions with perceptions of evaluative properties, 
even philosophers who reject this identification generally acknowledge that perceptions and 
emotions have many experiential similarities.20 In particular, Deonna and Teroni (2012: 66-
67) clearly expound this second point. In the same way that 
 
we can visually discriminate thousands of shades of color for which we simply 
lack the corresponding concepts […] we may surmise that the sensitivity to 
evaluative properties that [emotions] authorize is more fine-grained than the 
discriminations that evaluative judgments provide for. The idea would be, for 
instance, that the intensity of one’s fear co-varies with the degree of danger one 
faces, something our comparatively coarse evaluative judgments may prove 
unable to capture.  
 
To reformulate, the suggestion is that emotional experience is similar to perceptual 
experience in the following way: it can involve discriminations of evaluative properties that 
are more fine-grained than our existing evaluative concepts would allow, just as visual 
perception allows us to discriminate between more shades of blue than we currently have 




This claim might seem intuitively true, insofar as it accurately captures our experience of 
emotion. But there is a further reason to accept it. The fact that emotional experiences can 
involve such fine-grained evaluative discriminations helps explains why emotions tend to 
play an essential role in the process of acquiring and mastering evaluative concepts.21 
Emotions could not play this widely-acknowledged developmental role unless the evaluative 
nuances offered by emotional experiences could be more subtle than those allowed by our 
existing concepts. Again, this seems analogous to the case of visual perception. The fact that 
we can visually discriminate between many shades of blue prior to having access to 
corresponding concepts is part of what explains how we develop and master numerous color 
concepts in the first place. 
What does this mean for anger? The idea is that our experiences of anger can make us 
perceive or sense injustices that our pre-existing conceptual frameworks did not allow us to 
grasp. In turn, this emotional sensitivity facilitates the development of more nuanced moral 
concepts. As with the salience role of emotions, then, the emotional sensitivity to fine-grained 
evaluative differences can not only help us first recognize that injustices are occurring, but 
can also advance our understanding of those injustices, by enriching our conceptual resources 
for thinking about them. 
To clarify, consider the widely-discussed case of Carmita Wood (Fricker, 2007: 149-151). 
One of Wood’s male colleagues continuously subjected her to unwanted sexual advances. 
Though she felt unable to say why at the time, Wood’s deep indignation and bemusement 
made her sense that she was being treated wrongly. Reflecting on these responses in a 
consciousness-raising group then enabled her and others to first develop the concept of sexual 
harassment. Thus, Wood’s emotional sensitivity allowed her to recognize that she was being 
treated wrongly before she could even name the wrong in question. And that in turn helped 




concept of sexual harassment, Carmita Wood was better equipped to explain how her 
colleague had wronged her, and to recognize other wrongdoings of the same type more 
reliably. 
Let us conclude. Examining recent developments in the philosophy of emotion yields a 
theoretical account of two ways in which publicly expressing anger, by inspiring anger in 
one’s interlocutors, helps them recognize and understand injustices when they would 
otherwise have struggled to do so: first, by rendering certain morally-relevant properties 
salient which they had previously overlooked; second, by yielding perceptions of injustice 
that are more fine-grained than their existing moral concepts would allow. Notice that these 
two roles can come apart. Someone might already have extremely refined moral concepts, but 
might fail to apply them correctly because some non-moral properties of their environment 
are not salient to them. Conversely, someone might be aware of all the relevant non-moral 
properties but have very crude moral categories, which prevent them from seeing or fully 
understanding existing injustices. 
 
4.2.Two Historical Illustrations 
 
The foregoing account of anger’s epistemic value has been very abstract. To make it more 
concrete, let us consider two historical examples of political anger. The first focuses on 
Frederick Douglass’s denunciation of slavery. Before considering this example, let me clarify 
precisely what it is intended to illustrate. We have already seen, in the previous section, how 
Douglass used his gestures, tones, and rhetoric to express anger and thereby contagiously 
rouse his audience to anger. This, recall, was vividly reported in William Lloyd Garrison’s 





What I want to illustrate now is how the anger Douglass transmitted to his audience 
altered their perception of slavery in the epistemically beneficial way outlined in the previous 
section. Ideally, to do so, we would consider Garrison’s own testimony regarding how the 
anger he had acquired from Douglass modified his moral perception of slavery. But the 
problem is that Garrison’s testimony is not very precise when it comes to describing exactly 
how the anger Douglass’s speech excited in him changed his felt experience of slavery. He 
merely indicates that this anger made his perception of slavery’s wrongness “far more clear”. 
Douglass, on the other hand, reports in extremely rich detail how experiencing anger 
transformed his own perception of slavery. So, to illustrate my theoretical account of anger’s 
epistemic value, I will focus on Douglass’s testimony regarding his own anger. By 
considering how Douglass’s anger affected his perception of slavery, we can hope to learn 
about how being roused to anger by Douglass’s angry political speech may similarly have 
enhanced Garrison’s (and other audience members’) understanding of slavery’s injustice.22   
With this clarification in mind, let us turn to Douglass’s (1855:161) account of when, still 
a slave, he learned to read: 
 
The more I read, the more I was led to abhor and detest slavery, and my 
enslavers. […] I loathed them as the meanest and the most wicked of men […] 
Liberty! The inestimable birthright of every man had, for me, converted every 
object into an asserter of this great right. It was heard in every sound, and beheld 
in every object. It was ever present, to torment me with a sense of my wretched 
condition. […] My feelings were not the result of any marked cruelty in the 
treatment I received; they sprung from the consideration of my being a slave at 




clothing me well, could not atone for taking my liberty from me. The smiles of 
my mistress could not remove the deep sorrow that dwelt in my young bosom. 
 
Douglass clearly experiences intense anger: he “abhor[s]”, “detest[s]”, “loath[es]”, and 
“hate[s]” slavery and slaveholders. But he is not just telling us that he is angry. Instead, he is 
also reporting his felt experience of anger at slavery, how slavery appears from his angry 
perspective. Accordingly, he stresses how every object’s appearance was “converted” by his 
anger, and repeatedly employs perceptual language.  
What does this anger-infused perspective teach Douglass about slavery? First, Douglass’s 
anger draws his attention to how all things, including nonhuman animals, are free and 
independent in virtue of an “inestimable birthright”. By rendering salient the ubiquity of 
freedom, then, Douglass’s anger highlights his own degraded status.  
In turn, this helps him better understand the nature of slavery’s wrongness. The idea is 
that it is the status of slavery that is unjust, the very condition of depending on an arbitrary 
master, independently of that master’s oppressive actions. In Douglass’s words: it is 
“slavery—not merely its incidents”—that is wrong. Indeed, as he reports, by the standards he 
had previously been accustomed to, Douglass’s masters at this time were relatively kind. 
Thus, the angry perspective helps him perceive more precisely the ground of slavery’s 
wrongness, which concerns the relative standing or status of slaves. This is quite a fine-
grained understanding of the injustice of slavery and of the value of freedom, which arguably 
anticipates contemporary conceptualizations of freedom as non-domination (e.g., Pettit, 
1997), and which Douglass (as well as his audience) may otherwise have been unable to 
grasp. 
Hence, Douglass’s testimony regarding his anger vividly illustrates how anger can both 




independence of other living beings), and enable a more fine-grained understanding of 
injustice than may have been allowed by one’s prior moral categories (e.g., by making one 
sense the status-based wrong of slavery, domination). We may surmise that being roused to 
anger by Douglass’s angry political speech had a similarly beneficial phenomenological 
effect on Douglass’s audience. This helps us understand more precisely what Garrison may 
have been referring to when asserting that the anger gleaned from Douglass’s speech made 
his understanding of slavery’s injustice “far more clear”. 
Nussbaum might object that Douglass’s anger here is too close to her transitional anger to 
have much dialectical force against her. But notice how Douglass’s anger in fact differs from 
the standard case of transitional anger. His reference to loathing, abhorrence, and hatred 
suggests a harsh and fiery form of anger, rather than a calm and restrained one. Moreover, he 
focuses on the injustice itself, rather than on the remedy. This difference is crucial: because 
transitional anger characteristically does not dwell on the injustice itself, it is ill-suited to 
helping us understand the nature and depth of that injustice. Admittedly, though, Douglass’s 
anger here does seem qualified in some respects. First, his use of the past tense places some 
distance between his present attitude and that anger. Second, the conative dimension of his 
anger here does not seem to involve anything like retribution or violence.  
Hence, let us turn to Malcolm X for an even more intense expression of rage. In his 
speech ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’, Malcolm X (1964) denounces black Americans’ lack of 
economic and political opportunities: 
 
We’re trapped, trapped, double-trapped, triple-trapped. Any way we go, we find 
that we’re trapped […] So today our people are disillusioned. They’ve become 
disenchanted. And in 1964 you’ll see this young black man, this new generation, 




young generation don’t want to hear anything about “the odds are against us”. 
What do we care about the odds? […] When we open our eyes today and look at 
America, we see America not through the eyes of someone who has enjoyed the 
fruits of Americanism. We see America through the eyes of someone who has 
been the victim of Americanism. We don’t see any American dream. We’ve 
experienced only the American nightmare. We haven’t benefited from America’s 
democracy. We’ve only suffered from America’s hypocrisy. And the generation 
that’s coming up now can see. And are not afraid to say it. If you go to jail, so 
what? If you’re black, you were born in jail. 
 
Like Douglass, Malcolm X’s speech expresses deep anger. And like Douglass, he is reporting 
what it is like to be enraged at America’s racially-discriminatory practices, what one sees 
when one looks through the eyes of an outraged black American. Unlike Douglass, however, 
his anger does involve the conative dimension Nussbaum is wary of: it explicitly threatens 
violence (“the bullet”) which might well be retributive, born of a desire simply to retaliate 
(“what do we care about the odds?”). Let us examine what Malcolm X’s expression of deep 
non-transitional anger tells us about how anger affected his perception of racial injustices in 
America. As in the Douglass example, doing so will by extension help us learn something 
about how being contagiously roused to anger by Malcolm X’s fiery political speech may 
have been epistemically beneficial for his audience. 
Malcolm X’s rage reveals, in place of the American dream, a vision of the “American 
nightmare”. Indeed, just as Douglass’s anger draws his attention to the freedom of other 
beings, so Malcolm X’s anger renders salient the pattern of deceit that black Americans have 




“democracy” that they are effectively excluded from, and a civic freedom that seems no 
different from “jail”.  
By putting a spotlight on this pattern of disappointments, Malcolm X’s rage foregrounds 
important properties of the injustice black Americans encounter, properties that otherwise 
may have been obscured by the ideology of the American Dream. Firstly, seeing the pattern 
suggests that these exclusions are not accidental or isolated but systemic, built into the 
principal political and economic institutions of American society. So the hypocrisy blacks 
face is a national, American hypocrisy. Moreover, experiencing racial exclusions as patterned 
and systemic also conveys a sense of their inescapability (“we’re trapped”), and, 
consequently, of hopelessness at the prospect of achieving reform from within the American 
political system. Thus, via its salience role, Malcolm X’s anger yields a fuller understanding 
of the injustice at hand. 
Rendering these properties salient, finally, arguably helps refine prior evaluative 
categories: it contributes to adjusting dominant conceptions of what kinds of political agency 
count as reasonable. By highlighting patterns of exclusion, Malcolm X’s anger helps make 
rational sense of the apparently unreasonable attitude which consists in embracing violent 
action, even when the odds of success are unfavorable. If reforming the American system 
from within is hopeless, and if one’s situation is no better than jail, then violence aimed at 
putting one’s opponents in their place may seem the best option.  
In sum, these examples illustrate my theoretical account of how experiencing anger can 
enhance one’s understanding of existing injustices and of the reactions they elicit. When we 
put this together with the fact that publicly expressing anger can transmit anger to one’s 
audience by contagion (as happened with Garrison), this indicates how publicly expressing 
anger can enhance the moral understanding of one’s audience. But the point has not simply 




naturally of the language Douglass and Malcolm X use when reporting their anger—in 
particular, their perceptual language—should increase our confidence in its correctness. With 
this theoretical and historical defense in place, let us now consider a few objections. 
 
5. Objections to the Epistemic Productivity of Anger 
 
A common objection to giving emotions a significant role in democratic debate is that 
emotional speech is liable to be misused by demagogues, who appeal to emotions in a way 
that misleads their audience. Consider how this general concern applies to my defense of 
anger. I have argued that publicly expressing deep anger plays an important epistemic role in 
cases where the anger is fitting—that is, cases where anger is directed at genuine injustices 
and is proportionate to those injustices. But it might seem unclear what this means for angry 
political speech generally: as we observed in Section 2, much of the anger which 
characterizes actual politics is not fitting. Accordingly, public speakers often express 
misdirected anger at immigrants or religious minorities and thereby arouse misguided rage in 
their listeners. In such cases, publicly expressing deep anger may appear to be epistemically 
harmful, insofar as it induces one’s audience to perceive injustices where there are none or to 
misattribute their source. 
In response to this concern, one suggestion is that we should make space for public 
expressions of fitting anger, but not unfitting anger. However, this recommendation 
encounters pragmatic difficulties. In actual political contexts, which instances of anger are 
fitting and which are not is highly disputed. Adjudicating these disputes requires determining 
which instances of anger are tracking genuine injustices and how significant those injustices 
are. Not only can this task be challenging, but I have been arguing that expressions of anger 




not know which instances of anger are fitting and unfitting until after we have been exposed 
to public expressions of anger. Thus, the original concern remains: even if angry discourse 
can be epistemically beneficial when the anger is fitting, making space for anger in the public 
sphere risks also opening the door to dangerous expressions of unfitting anger. 
If we cannot make space for fitting anger without also making space for misdirected 
anger, does this mean that we should avoid angry discourse altogether? We should resist this 
suggestion. In the first place, it is important to note that unfitting anger may sometimes have 
some epistemic value. As Section 2 discussed, fittingness comes in degrees. While some 
instances of anger are wholly unfitting—recall the white supremacist’s rage at having black 
neighbors—unfitting anger is often only partly so. Some occurrences of anger, for example, 
might correctly represent a situation as involving injustice while representing the wrong 
group as blameworthy for this injustice. If the injustice in question is not known or 
understood by the society at large, expressing this partly-unfitting anger may contribute to 
advancing our understanding in the way I have theorized. This is brought out powerfully in 
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s (2016) Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the 
American Right, where Hochschild documents the angry narratives of Tea Party supporters in 
Louisiana. While the anger they express is arguably directed at the wrong agents (e.g., 
minority groups, the Environmental Protection Agency), Hochschild vividly depicts how 
listening to their anger rendered salient an underappreciated pattern of hardship (e.g., rising 
joblessness, pollution-related illnesses, environmental decay, cultural vilification). What is 
striking is how, notwithstanding their mixed fittingness, these angry narratives effectively 
bring into view an unjust pattern of broken socioeconomic promises—in a way that, in some 
respects, echoes Malcolm X’s disillusion with the American Dream. In this way, expressions 
of partly-misdirected anger can lead us to register and examine a previously-overlooked 




we should not recoil too quickly at the idea of admitting public expressions of unfitting 
anger: anger that is partly unfitting may retain some of the epistemic value I have theorized.23   
But even insofar as expressions of misdirected anger are epistemically harmful, a more 
fundamental response is available. Even if making space for epistemically valuable 
expressions of anger opens the door for epistemically harmful expressions of anger, non-
angry and non-emotional forms of discourse encounter similar problems. Indeed, notice that 
dispassionate argument too can be abused. In conditions where reliable information is scarce 
or difficult to interpret, one of the most successful forms of sophistry consists in endowing 
fallacious claims and inferences with the appearance of rationality and scientific expertise. 
We are all too familiar with how purported experts sometimes weigh in misleadingly to 
public debates by showering listeners with esoteric formulas, technical jargon, or deceptive 
statistics. And yet, we standardly do not think that because dispassionate argument can be 
misused in public discourse, we should forego it altogether. Admittedly, this response is an 
unhappy one for democratic discourse more generally: it concedes that otherwise useful 
epistemic practices can be put to bad epistemic ends in non-ideal conditions involving 
widespread public ignorance. However, this response does suggest 1) that the problem at 
hand is not a special problem afflicting angry speech and 2) that just as we do not reject 
norms of argumentative reasoning simply because they can be abused in non-ideal 
conditions, so too we should not abandon the use of anger in political discourse.  
But publicly-expressed anger faces further objections. While the previous worry 
concerned the possibility that anger might be misdirected, another goes further and 
interrogates the claim that fittingly-directed anger is epistemically desirable. Perhaps it is true 
that such anger can render certain facts more salient, namely those that are liable to ground 
injustices. But, according to Pettigrove, empirical research suggests that anger also obscures 




stimuli than they are to notice features of their environment they do not take to be hostile” 
(2012: 363). Relatedly, “people who have become angry are generally less responsive to 
counterevidence” (2012: 365). So, anger risks yielding a distorted perspective on the world.  
An initial reply is that I am not recommending that all public discourse be angry. Rather, I 
am defending the view that angry discourse should play an important role in democratic 
deliberation. The idea is not that angry discourse should supplant countervailing perspectives 
that non-angry speech communicates, but that it should complement them. It enriches 
countervailing perspectives, bringing into view features of the social context that they 
overlook or struggle to accommodate, but does not replace them altogether.24 When the 
dominant ideology masks injustices—as, say, when the ideology of the American Dream 
concealed structural barriers to black Americans’ social mobility—the angry perspective 
serves as a crucial epistemic corrective, which casts a spotlight on these injustices. But this 
should ideally be a corrective, not a substitute. Therefore, the fact that anger highlights some 
otherwise neglected morally relevant facts while obscuring others may be relatively 
unproblematic, insofar as non-angry speech can communicate those other facts. 
Pettigrove might object that this initial response does not fully appreciate the depth of the 
problem. What my response assumes is that after someone has been exposed to angry speech 
and roused to anger, non-angry speech might complement their angry perspective by 
illuminating the features of the situation that anger distracts from. Perhaps this is possible in 
the long run, after the angry person’s episode of anger has ceased. But since we are not 
talking about Nussbaum’s fleeting transitional anger, it could be a long time before the 
episode of anger subsides. In fact, Pettigrove (2012: 365) suggests that anger involves a 
feedback loop, such that anger perpetuates itself: anger focuses our attention on injustices, to 
the exclusion of other features of the situation, which in turn makes us more angry. This 




purports to show that, so long as we are still angry, our anger impedes our ability to register 
or grasp the countervailing evidence that non-angry speech tries to bring to our attention. 
Thus, in the short run, at least, it is far from clear that it is possible to balance the perspective 
yielded by anger through non-angry speech. 
As such, the second observation to make in response to Pettigrove’s challenge is that even 
if angry speech does conceal some features of the situation—that is, even if it is pro tanto 
epistemically bad—it may still be epistemically beneficial overall. More precisely, if the 
injustices highlighted by fitting anger are highly important, and if they were persistently 
overlooked or obscured by prevailing perspectives, our coming to fixate on them may be the 
lesser of two epistemic evils. In the non-ideal contexts we have been considering, where a 
dominant ideology masks grave injustices, it is prima facie plausible to think that these 
conditions are satisfied. When politically empowered white Americans fail to notice or fully 
understand the moral horrors of slavery, or when the ideology of the American Dream 
conceals the systematic social, economic, and political barriers that stand in the way of black 
Americans, the epistemic benefits of anger may well outweigh its costs.    
A final pair of objections questions the transmission of anger to the audience. My account 
of anger’s distinctive epistemic contribution rests on the claim that publicly expressing anger 
can help arouse anger in listeners. One might worry that this transmission is only possible 
when anger is epistemically redundant. Being angry at x involves representing x as somehow 
containing an injustice. But if that is so, wouldn’t one need to already believe that x involved 
an injustice in order to get angry at x? As a result, how could the transmission of anger ever 
bring to our attention injustices that we had overlooked?  
In fact, the contagious transmission of anger does not require that one already believe that 
the situation involves an injustice. As explained in 4.1, emotional contagion is a largely 




expressions and body language, rather than a cognitively-demanding assessment of their 
claims or of their situation. So, one can acquire anger through a causal mechanism that 
bypasses one’s conscious evaluation of the situation. In turn, when one has become angry, 
that anger colors the way one perceives or imagines the situation. Now, this is not to deny 
that there can be other, more cognitive ways of coming to share others’ emotions. In some 
cases, Alvin Goldman (2011) suggests, we first imagine the perspective of another, perhaps 
judging on this basis that their situation is unjust, and this contributes to generating a relevant 
emotion. But what matters for my purposes is that emotional contagion—which is the mode 
of emotional transmission that enjoys the most robust empirical support25—is not cognitively 
demanding in this way.  
Additionally, even if one already believes that a given situation is unjust, we have seen 
that anger can still draw one’s attention to features of the situation that help one better 
understand the nature of that injustice. This was particularly clear in the Douglass example. 
Douglass’s anger draws his attention to his comparative unfreedom. This highlights his 
degraded status, and helps him understand more clearly what makes slavery unjust. 
Accordingly, Garrison, despite already deeming slavery unjust, claimed that he acquired a 
clearer understanding of its injustice when inflamed by Douglass’s angry speech.  
Nevertheless, there is a second and more daunting transmission-related worry, which 
concerns the feasibility of transmitting anger in non-ideal conditions. I have cited evidence 
which supports the claim that anger can be contagiously transmitted by publicly expressing 
anger. However, one might object that emotional contagion and the perspective-taking it 
facilitates have limits, which are particularly salient in the non-ideal conditions I am focusing 
on. After all, doesn’t resonating with the speaker’s anger require that the audience identify 




conditions that give rise to anger in the first place—namely, deep social divisions which 
generate pervasive injustices? 
As it stands, this objection is overstated. Expressing anger is not wholly ineffective in 
such circumstances. As we have seen, Douglass’s rage successfully induced profound anger 
in Garrison, a white abolitionist. Furthermore, some cases suggest that the transmission of 
anger is sometimes possible even between individuals with significantly different worldviews 
and backgrounds. Famously, Republican vice-president Dan Quayle (1992) once declared 
that he had vicariously gained important insights into what it is like to experience racial 
injustice from Malcolm X’s fiery autobiography: “I can see the hate that was there; I can see 
the bigotry; I can see it from his perspective”.  
Nevertheless, once qualified, the objection does have significant strength. There is 
presumably some point at which social divisions and the attending mutual distrust become 
too great to allow anger to be automatically transmitted. If group A have very low levels of 
trust towards group B, so that they doubt the sincerity or competence of members of B, it 
seems unlikely that they will resonate with those members’ angry speech. For example, when 
prejudicial gender stereotypes represent women as epistemically untrustworthy, those who 
consciously or unconsciously accept those stereotypes typically experience women’s anger 
not as a signal of some serious injustice to be investigated but rather as a symptom of 
women’s supposedly hysterical natures. Instead of resonating with the anger, they experience 
it as alienating or absurd (Frye, 1983: 90-91).26 
What can we say about cases where this required trust is lacking between a speaker and 
their audience? Firstly, Marilyn Frye notes that historically, distrust has fruitfully been 
tackled by challenging the demeaning stereotypes that underpin it. In the case of gendered 
distrust, “the struggles and victories of abolitionists, suffragists, prohibitionists, and other 




causes” (1983: 98). In this light, taking measures to transform gender roles—for instance, by 
regulating media representations of women—can continue to reduce the distrust which 
prevents many women’s anger from being heard.  
Secondly, as democratic theorists have recently stressed, public deliberation often takes a 
systemic or networked form: it involves many different deliberative arenas, which are 
connected in virtue of the fact that their constituencies overlap (Mansbridge and Parkinson, 
2012). As a result, even when distrust persists, the possibility for “networked” angry speech 
weakens the significance of this distrust. Suppose our society contains three people, A, B, and 
C. Because C deeply distrusts A, A cannot transmit her anger to C. But B trusts A, and C 
trusts B.  Hence, A can communicate her angry perspective to B. And B, in turn, can relay 
that angry perspective by expressing it to C. Consider, for instance, how Elizabeth Warren, a 
white US Senator, relayed the message of Black Lives Matter in 2015. Her voice shaking 
with palpable anger, she declared: 
 
It shouldn’t take a revolution on Youtube to drive a revolution in law 
enforcement. It shouldn’t take a Hurricane in New Orleans or a massacre in 
Charleston for Americans to wake up to what is happening to people of color in 
this country […] House Republicans may still want to fly the confederate flag 
[…] but the American people understand that black lives matter (cited in 
Ferguson, 2015). 
 
By relaying the perspective of a group (here, black left-wing activists) that may be distrusted 
by other social groups (say, politically-moderate whites), such networked angry speech helps 




Admittedly, these two replies are not entirely satisfactory. Just as the affirmative policies 
Frye recommends may be slow in producing their intended effects, so relaying angry speech 
is liable to be an arduous task. Contrary to the simple schema I outlined above, the chain of 
networked angry speech can be very long. In part, this is because those who relay the angry 
perspective risk losing the trust of agents who currently trust them unless they communicate 
that perspective to listeners who are ideologically relatively close to them. Suppose Garrison 
tried to relay Douglass’s rage. Though Garrison was presumably less distrusted by 
slaveholders than Douglass, it seems unlikely that they trusted him enough to resonate with 
his angry speech. And slightly more progressive politicians, who trust Garrison enough, 
might come to distrust him because of his association with Douglass’s message. Hence, 
Garrison might have to try to convey the angry perspective to listeners who are even closer 
ideologically. Progress could be excruciatingly slow.  
Still, this qualification should not obscure the fact that over the long haul, publicly-
expressed anger can be epistemically productive. Moreover, the systemic view of public 
deliberation also helps appreciate how, in the meantime, publicly-expressed anger might be 
epistemically productive in a more indirect way. In a system involving many different 
deliberative venues, some of which involve angry speech and others not, angry and non-
angry speech might play complementary roles. More specifically, the presence of angry 
speech can sometimes help non-angry speakers acquire the trust of wary listeners, thereby 
enabling them to convey a message that they otherwise could not have communicated.  
Suppose that listeners do not trust a given angry speaker enough to resonate with their 
anger, because they accept prejudicial stereotypes which associate the anger of the speaker’s 
social group with unreason. In such circumstances, the contrast between angry and non-angry 
speech can make non-angry speakers appear more reasonable, and worth engaging with. 




perhaps they will be more willing to listen to Dr. King” (cited in Baldwin, 1986: 398). And 
indeed, without the contrast with Malcolm X’s violent rage, many whites may have deemed 
King’s vision of interracial love too extreme to be worth listening to. Thus, by altering 
prevailing norms of what counts as reasonable, angry speech can help non-angry perspectives 
gain uptake. Hence, even when there are still low levels of antecedent trust, and when angry 
speech has not yet been relayed in the way described above, angry speech can still be 
indirectly epistemically productive. The more general lesson here, which Nussbaum’s attack 
on anger obscures and the systemic perspective brings into view, is that non-angry 
approaches to the promotion of justice often depend for their successful communication on 




In defense of the view that expressing anger has a key role to play in democratic public 
discourse, I have argued that advocates of the counterproductivity objection typically 
overlook anger’s distinctive epistemic contribution. And while defenders of political anger 
often allude to its epistemic value, they generally do not avail themselves of the philosophical 
resources needed to articulate it precisely. As contemporary philosophical research on 
emotion indicates, experiencing anger helps render morally significant facts salient and 
contributes to enriching our moral concepts. Therefore, insofar as it induces listeners to 
imaginatively experience anger, expressing anger enables them to register previously 
overlooked injustices, and to develop a finer understanding of those injustices. In this, we 
have a systematization of the intuitively compelling suggestion with which we started: that 
expressing anger is there to teach the audience something, by casting a spotlight on “what [is] 




angry speech is easily misapplied, that it is epistemically unsound or redundant, and that its 
value would require unrealistic levels of trust—these objections are not decisive, particularly 
once we conceive of public deliberation as occurring within a system composed of 
interlocking deliberative spheres. 
Finally, the foregoing philosophical defense should help guide empirical research on 
anger’s productivity, in two ways. First, offering a theoretical account of what makes public 
anger epistemically valuable signals a new kind of consequence that social scientists should 
look for when exploring anger’s productivity. More specifically, they should investigate 
under what exact conditions publicly expressing anger tends to rouse listeners to anger. 
Second, the systemic approach to deliberation reminds us that we cannot conclude too much 
from empirical evidence regarding the effects angry speech has in isolation. Consequently, 
empirical research should study more fully the complementary relations that obtain between 
angry and non-angry speech. In the meantime, by considering the anger of Frederick 
Douglass and Malcolm X, I hope to have given a preliminary sense of how, when skillfully 
channeled, rage inside the democratic machine can play a crucial part in combatting injustice.  
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Avia Pasternak, Jason Stanley, Jens Van ‘t Klooyster, Yuan Yuan, two anonymous reviewers 
for Politics, Philosophy and Economics, and audiences at the Yale Moral Philosophy 
Working Group and the Cambridge Political Philosophy Workshop. This paper also benefited 
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2 For numerous vivid examples of the counterproductivity objection in political discourse, see 
Srinivasan (forthcoming: 1-3). I also illustrate this in Section 3.1, when citing Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s response to Malcolm X.  
3 For early statements, see Manin (1987), Cohen (1989), Habermas (1996) and Elster (1997).  
4 For political philosophers besides Young who emphasise the importance of emotions in 
democratic public discourse, see, e.g., Williams (2000: 146-152), Krause (2008), Chambers 
(2009), and Dryzek (2010: ch.4). For instances where accounts of democratic deliberation 
privilege dispassionate argument, see, e.g., Elster (1998: 109) and Spragens (1990: 128). 
5 On emotions’ intentionality, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 3–6), Brun et al (2008: 11–12), 
Nussbaum (2015: 42–43).  
6 Cogley (2014: 201-203). See also Chakravarti (2014: 3–6), Jaggar (1989: 165), Nussbaum 
(2015: 42-43), Callard (forthcoming). According to Srinivasan (forthcoming: 6n21), it is 
arguable that some species of anger aim to represent their object as involving non-moral 
normative violations (for instance, the anger of a football fan at a player’s poor athletic 
performance). Alongside the political and moral philosophers cited above, however, I will 
focus on the species of anger that purports to represent moral violations.  
7 Cogley (2014: 202-203). I am grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
8 This picture of anger is compatible with many theories of the emotions, including the 
perceptual theory (e.g., Döring (2007: 363–94)), and the attitudinal theory (e.g., Deonna and 
Teroni (2012)). And although, as I discuss later, it is unclear whether the evaluative judgment 
theory (e.g., Nussbaum (2015)) can accommodate anger’s distinctive phenomenology, its 
advocates typically acknowledge that emotions are phenomenologically distinctive, and try to 
show that their framework can account for this phenomenology. For discussion, see note 18. 
9 For evidence linking anger to retributive desires, see Lazarus (1991). Nussbaum actually 




                                                                                                                                                        
We should reject this claim. First, some of the evidence Nussbaum herself cites suggests that 
anger commonly seeks control or justice, which are both conceptually distinct from 
vengeance. E.g., Tavris (1982: 153-55). See also Srinivasan (forthcoming: 7) for a critique of 
this claim.   
10 Bell (2009) also discusses Douglass, but primarily considers the virtue of anger, rather than 
its public expression. Note that, as the introduction explained, I am concerned with cases 
where anger is fittingly directed—that is, cases involving genuine injustices. Therefore, I 
focus on instances where Douglass’s and Malcolm X’s anger seems fitting, because it targets 
clearly unjust practices. 
11 See Baldwin (1986). 
12 E.g., Dryzek (2010), Rawls (1997). 
13 Historical critics of anger, and notably of its counterproductivity, include Seneca, Joseph 
Butler, and Adam Smith. Seneca, who is quoted above, holds that anger, in virtue of 
recklessly seeking vengeance, is at odds with man’s nature (I.6), is inconsistent with reason 
(I.9), and risks resulting in destruction for both targets of anger and those experiencing anger 
(I.1). As for Smith, he holds that anger, “more than almost any other passions, can’t become 
graceful and agreeable unless it is humbled down below the pitch to which it would naturally 
rise” (I.ii.ch.3). Unless anger is tempered thus, “it renders a person the object of universal 
dread and abhorrence, who, like a wild beast, ought […] to be hunted out of all civil society” 
(I.ii.ch.4). Thus, although Smith does not categorically reject anger, he does seem to view the 
intense non-transitional anger with which we are concerned as counterproductive, because it 
endangers social bonds. For discussion of Smith on anger, see Chakravarti (2014: 106-108). 
Butler, like Smith, does not wholly condemn all forms of anger. Although anger is “in every 
instance absolutely an evil in itself; because it implies producing misery” (XIX.7), anger 




                                                                                                                                                        
does condemn anger when it takes on a form that strives for revenge (VIII.3-4). Hence, it 
seems that he too accepts anger only if it takes on a non-vengeful form, akin to Nussbaum’s 
transitional anger.  
Contemporary critics of anger include Nussbaum (2015; 2016) and Pettigrove (2012: 347, 
369-370), both of whom are discussed above, as well as Daniel Silvermint. For Silvermint, 
addressing agents of injustice with “hardened” or “unsympathetic” forms of anger risks being 
counterproductive. Doing so “might […] just perpetuate cycles of oppressive mistreatment” 
(2017: 10) and therefore constitutes an “unnecessary risk” (2017: 3). 
14 E.g., Frye (1983), Jaggar (1989), Bell (2009), Chakravarti (2014, ch.5).  
15 See Matravers (2017: 1–2) for this identification. Some theorists define empathy more 
narrowly, making perspective-taking necessary but not sufficient for empathy. E.g., Coplan 
(2011). Others suggest that empathy is essentially about experiencing the same affect as 
another being, and do not make imaginative perspective-taking a necessary condition. E.g., 
Goldman (2011).  
16 For summaries in the philosophical and psychological literatures, respectively, see Coplan 
(2011) and Barsade (2002).  
17 For tentative evidence of contagion from angry facial expressions, see Blairy et al (1999: 
35), Hess and Blairy (2001: 138–39), Friedman and Riggio (1981: 102–3). 
18 Nussbaum and Pettigrove are quick to dismiss the distinctive epistemic value of anger in 
part because they overlook this phenomenology. It is widely held that the distinctive 
phenomenology of emotion is irreducible to the phenomenology of a judgment, or even of a 
judgment/desire pairing. E.g., Deonna and Teroni, (2012: 66–71), Goldie (2002: 73–74). But 
both Nussbaum (2015: 42-45) and Pettigrove (2012: 357-358) broadly take anger about x to 
be reducible to a judgment/desire pairing, involving roughly a judgment that x involves some 




                                                                                                                                                        
try, elsewhere, to accommodate the rich phenomenology of emotions within her judgment 
theory of emotions. However, Ben Ze-Ev (2004) and Deonna and Teroni (2012: ch.5) 
forcefully rebut this attempt. Further, even if her account could accommodate emotional 
experience’s complexity, the problem remains that Nussbaum’s brief discussion of anger’s 
epistemic value does not integrate these insights. She simply stresses that anger signals the 
judgments that something is morally amiss, and that something should be done about it 
(2015: 55-56).  
19  On the salience role, see Brun et al (2008: 18), Elgin (2008: 43–46), Deonna and Teroni 
(2012: 122), Brady (2013: 16–25), Jaggar (1989: 160). 
20 For perceptual theories of emotions, see, e.g., Döring (2007). For other theories that 
acknowledge these phenomenological resemblances, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 66–67), 
Elgin (2008: 36-37), Brun et al (2008: 15). Nussbaum (2001: 65), in her general analysis of 
emotion, also uses language which reflects this analogy.  
21 On the role of emotions in conceptual development, see Deonna and Teroni (2012: 84), 
Brun et al (2008:  20-21), Tappolet (2011: 126–27), Jaggar (1989: 166–68). 
22 I am grateful to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify how exactly these examples are 
supposed to work.  
23 In her influential theoretical discussion of the relation between narrative and objectivity, 
Iris Marion Young (2000: ch.3) also suggests that narratives expressing views and emotions 
that are partly incorrect may nevertheless have some epistemic value. For Young, because 
“all positionings are partial with respect to the inquiry […] [t]he explicit voicing of the 
plurality of positions and their confirming or criticizing one another is necessary for 
objectivity” (2000: 114-115). In saying this, Young affirms that expressions of partly 
incorrect perspectives can enhance our understanding: while these outlooks may distort some 




                                                                                                                                                        
24 As Pettigrove himself concedes in a footnote (2012: 373n71), one study by Young et al 
(2011: 16) finds that the way anger selects information can serve to counteract confirmation 
bias—the bias towards information which supports one’s existing beliefs and hypotheses. 
This tendency, the authors conclude, “may actually provide angry individuals with the 
cognitive benefit of getting a fuller, more balanced perspective”. This conclusion tentatively 
supports the epistemic role I am suggesting here for angry public discourse, as a complement 
which renders neglected dimensions of the world visible, and thereby enriches the dominant 
worldview without replacing it altogether. 
25 See Coplan (2011:  8). 
26 For evidence that emotional contagion across social groups is more difficult, see Bourgeois 
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